Home // For Jason Zarri as a Memorial of his passing October 31, 2014: More of his Grandfather’s Philosophical Legacy: typed up by Peter Krey

For Jason Zarri as a Memorial of his passing October 31, 2014: More of his Grandfather’s Philosophical Legacy: typed up by Peter Krey

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For Jason Zarri as a Memorial of his passing October 31, 2014:

His Grandfather’s Philosophical Papers

Jason can be celebrated as someone who had an extraordinarily philosophical mind. He most probably inherited it from his grandfather, Joseph Zarri. What follows are two exams of his grandfather taken at the University of San Francisco. Between them is a paper in which he recorded some philosophical thoughts. For the first exam, his answers are written in the usual Blue Book. He received an A from Father Wilson, his professor. His philosophy in this exam is thoroughly Thomist and Aristotelian. St. Thomas was called the Angelic Doctor, hence the allusions to angels. Father Wilson’s course was Philosophy 5b and the booklet is dated May 6th 1947.

  1. St. Anselm held the “Ontological Argument” valid as a proof of God’s Existence. [He] formulated it as follows:

[His] idea of God is that being than which nothing greater exists; otherwise [he] could conceive of a greater one, i.e., one that has existence.

Therefore, God exists.

This argument is invalid as it is an illicit transition from the logical to the ontological order. All it proves is that if God exists, He must exist necessarily. However, one must first prove that God exists or that He is possible, at least.

  • All creatures are composed of two co-principles – essence and existence. The essence limits the existence to so much and no more and thus makes possible multiplicity in being. Only in God are essence and existence identified and thus He is the only infinite being. Since only one infinite being is possible, all other beings are finite – [meaning their] essence and existence are distinct.

All material beings have a composite essence made up of matter (potential principle) and form (the actual principle). This is proven by the facts of substantial

change and the multiplication of the same essence within the species. If the essence of a being is simple, there can only be one in the species, e.g. angels.

All creatures are further composed of substance and accidents. The potential principle (substance) in material beings is essence (matter as form) to existence and in angels, essence (simple) to existence.

[Actual existence is always an act – never a substance potency. Wilson]

[His correction probably applies to the next sentence:]

This substance is potency to further perfection, as beings must act to perfect themselves. Angels have accidental changes – successions of thoughts, while material beings are subject to all kinds of accidental changes which leave their essential nature intact.

  • St. Thomas held that our knowledge was presentative, i.e. that we know objects directly by means of the concepts (intellectual knowledge) and the sensible species (sensitive knowledge). We do not know the idea first and then the objects which they are supposed to represent as in representative theory of Descartes. Descartes held that our ideas are innate and that thought is the essence of mind, [which] as extension is essence of matter. This followed from his psychological dualism – the splitting of [human beings] into two complete substances – body and soul – joined only in an accidental union.

If our ideas are really what we know and not the object, how can we ever be sure that our ideas are true representations of the object, since we can never compare the two. Thus one becomes imprisoned within the confines of his own mind and the way is opened to idealism. Descartes was not an idealist but he led the way. He held the reality of the extra-mental world of matter. For him, though, the ideas are innate, rising from the unconscious to the conscious through the occasion of experience.

  • Porphyry (275) asked three questions on the problem of universals which were translated by Boethius [480-524] and so transmitted to the medieval world. Are universals only names? Do they exist only in the mind? Have they any ontological (extra-mental) reality?

Roscelin [1050-c.1125] answered the question by saying they were merely names. (at least his opponents claim he held this doctrine (nominalism) – [meaning there were] no concepts in the mind corresponding to these names and [there was] no extra-mental reality for them.

William of Champeaux [1070-1122] held the doctrine of extreme realism – that the universals existed formally outside of the mind.

St. Thomas held the doctrine of moderate realism – universals exist formally only in the mind, but fundamentally in the things. They exist in things but individualized. The mind abstracts them from these individuating notes and so makes them exist formally in it.

—————

From a folded yellowed paper tucked into the booklet, with writing that has almost disappeared, Joseph Zarri has some philosophical thoughts:

Nature’s possibility of an a posteriori proof:

     from proper effect to proper cause (existence of)

     from essentially subordinated causes

God knows

  1. Only Himself directly and immediately
  2. Knows creatures (things other than Himself) because

these are limited participations of His essence and are

caused by Him and wholly dependent on Him.

  • possible things (simple intelligences)
  • actual things (science of vision)

Nature of Creation

     Not an action nor a passion – not a change –

but a relation in creation of absolute dependence on the Creator.

God could not have produced the world from pre-existing subject nor from Himself as subject, because He is unchangeable and unlimited.

God’s creative action is eternal, therefore the beginning of the world in time not demanded.

On the side [of] creatures, creation contains no reference to time. Essence abstracts from time.

Passive creation implies only a priority of being in God, not a priority of time.

________________________

In the back of 24 pages of typed notes on the

Nature of Epistemology

March 25th 1946 in Philosophy 3 Joseph Zarri received a B for the answers to these questions:

  1. Name two sceptics in Ancient Philosophy

A: Protagoras and Georgias

  • Give two reasons for skepticism in Ancient Philosophy.

A: Scepticism arose from the fact that philosophers had given greatly different answers to the questions of philosophy – they could not agree among themselves.

Some of their doctrines also contradicted common sense, as for example, the Eleatics, when they denied change and motion. Another reason was non-philosophical and was to be found in the political conditions of Athens, where rhetoric was more highly prized than truth and where the cynical doctrine that might makes right prevailed.

  • Give the refutation of universal skepticism.

A: Universal skepticism is impossible for this reason: when the sceptic says  “I doubt about everything,” he has already refuted himself because it shows that he is certain of his state of doubt. It shows that he is certain of at least one thing. Even if he states this as an opinion, rather than as a certitude, he is still certain of the possibility of his statement.

(In red from the instructor: Suppose he maintains silence?)

If he maintains silence it shows that after reflection and with use of reason, he has arrived at conclusions that it is better to remain silent than put forth an opinion. So it shows that he makes use of reason and assumes its validity in maintaining silence. He is certain at least of the possibility of the wisdom of maintaining silence. The only other reason why he would maintain silence is that he is insane – incapable of using his reason. From another angle – if he did maintain silence how would one even know that he was a sceptic?

  • Check the proper method for beginning epistemology.
    • A universal doubt (Descartes)
    • The assumption of three primary truths
    • The retention of all spontaneous certitudes and connecting them to scientific certitude.
    • An initial fictitious universal doubt.

A: The proper philosophical method is to retain all of our spontaneous certitudes and connect them to scientific certitudes.

  • A question in two parts:
    • Name two modern philosophers denying the existence of an individual thinking subject.
    • Give the properties of the existence of an individual thinking subject.

A: David Hume and Bishop George Berkeley William James. The existence of an individual thinking subject is proved from the fact of memory, which is unintelligible apart from a subject. Another proof is the fact of moral responsibility. If there were nothing but thoughts, why should one thought feel responsible for a previous one? The only intelligible explanation is the existence of a permanent subject.

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