

Marxism, a Science or Secular Religion?

My Book Notes, especially after reading Max Eastman: Marxism: Is It Science:

R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, Oxford University Press, 1946, my 1975 reprint),

Writing in Collingwood's book, as I usually do in books that really speak to me, I wrote a note on the inside of the back cover referring to page 180:

[A historian] is still worried by the fact that however much information we have concerning a given period, we still might obtain more, and this might modify the results already thought secure.

I felt this all the time, with Hegel for example. But often more reading does not modify my results. "The Historian's problem is a present one, not a future one," says Collingwood. "It is to interpret the material now available and not anticipate future discoveries." But often I feel that I have not mastered the basic representative writings in the field. For example, I have not read much of Hegel myself, only secondary sources.¹

Also page 180: "The word 'truth' has no meaning for a historian unless it means 'what the evidence obliges us to believe.'" (Collingwood is citing Oakeshott)

¹ For example, W.T. Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel: a Systematic Exposition*, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955). It was first published by Macmillan & Company, Inc. in 1924.

With my book *Hegel and the Trinity*,² I needed to command the theology of the Trinity, the philosophy of Hegel and all the heretical views of the Trinity and the critique of Hegel's philosophy. My grounding was inadequate in terms of being scholarly enough as a student. But for me it was quite a learning experience.³

I gave up on my book, *Does the Immanent Trinity Precede the Economic Trinity in Hegel* after reading *The Heterodox Hegel* by Cyril O'Regan, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994). Just like I gave up on writing my *Updating the Exodus* after reading three books by some historian who argued for adjusting all of ancient history by (if I remember correctly) about 600 years. I did not know how to refute him. Other historians told me to ignore his work. But after reading him I could not continue. I thought studying the archeology of the period would throw new light on the dating of Joseph and the Exodus, but I found out that archeology raised more questions than it answered.

In the margin of Collingwood's book, page 180, I also wrote: Lessing from Leibniz about "the unbridgeable gap between universal truths and historical contingencies." I picked up

² Peter Krey, *Does the Economic Trinity Precede the Immanent Trinity in Hegel?* (Unpublished).

³ For example, at the time I did not know that Luther wrote a long exposition on the Holy Trinity in Luther's Works, vol. 15, (St Louis: Concordia Publishing Company, 1972), pages 265-352: *The Treatise on the Last Words of David, 2 Samuel 23:1-7*; Also see the *Weimar Edition LIV*, 28-100. Luther reported writing this treatise in June of 1543.

Kierkegaard's ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments***, vol. 1, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, editors, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), page 97,

and I find him quoting Lessing to this effect, first citing him in German and then translated: "contingent truths of history can never become the demonstration of necessary truths of reason." I don't see Lessing quoted by Collingwood, however. I don't remember why I wrote Lessing's words in the margin. I believe, however, that Lessing takes his point of departure from Gottfried Leibniz's distinction between contingent facts versus necessary truths.

The reason that I started typing up these notes was to critique

Max Eastman, ***Marxism: Is it Science?*** (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1940)

from the point of view of Polanyi,⁴ Collingwood, and Thomas Kuhn as well. A long time ago I read

Lars Udehn, ***Methodological Individualism***, New York: Routledge, 2001),

and I hoped he would write his second work on Methodological Collectivism or Holism, but I am pretty sure that he never wrote that book. A System's Approach, I believe, makes inroads into a collective, holistic methodology.⁵

⁴ Michael Polanyi, ***Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy***, Harper Torchbook, Harper & Row Publishers, 1958, 1962), page 227-228.

⁵ See Peter Steinke's books, ***Healthy Congregations***, for example, (Herndon, VA: the Alban Institute, 1996).

Can objectivism confuse itself, like confusing words with their referents (*verbum et res*)? Can the subjective be oblivious to itself hiding in the objective? Objectivity is still a subjective state, because there is no thought possible, whether objective or subjective, unless it comes from the mind.

Willard Van Orman Quine writes: "There is many a slip twixt the objective cup and the subjective lip."⁶ This quip by Quine, does not really support my Hegelian statement, that even objectivity is a subjective state of mind, because Quine sees statements having a much more complex relation with experience, a complexity that mere objectivity versus subjectivity oversimplifies. But this is not the place to get into Quine and his need to quantify language for the sake of greater scientific precision. I want to write up my notes on Max Eastman because his critique of Hegel and Marxism as more religious than scientific seems to be vulnerable to Collingwood and Kuhn's critique. His concept of science predates their critique.

May 2, 2019: Teilhard writes of crossing the collective threshold of thought: could that be related with class consciousness? I may have to read Georg Lukács' ***History and Class Consciousness***. I only read the introduction. But what does Teilhard mean precisely? He presents it like an ideal, a

⁶ Willard Van Orman Quine, ***Methods of Logic***, Revised Edition, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1950, 1959), page XII.

breakthrough of some sort.⁷ For Hegel the real is rational and the rational is real. That seems to make realities as dialectical as thought. But look how very far Quine even finds statements estranged from physical objects: "But utterances about physical objects are not verifiable or refutable by direct comparison with experience." (Also page XII.) Obviously Hegel is a continental rationalist and Quine is a British empiricist, but Collingwood might also critique Quine's objectivism. After all, the historians internalize history within themselves and write it for their present time. Collingwood describes it as a very subjective process.

Luther writes that for the theologian the *verbum* is the *res*. That means that the words contain the goods that they speak of, because it is only by words and language proclaimed that through faith the will of God - not yet done on earth, becomes done among us and the Kingdom of Heaven becomes near at hand.⁸ The Word of God proclaimed when believed and lived makes the kingdom of heaven at hand about us.

⁷ Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man*, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1959), pages 288 and 303.

⁸ See the essay I wrote about Luther "Calling Everything Back from Works to the Word," because all our goods come from the Word. I posted this essay in my website <https://peterkrey.wordpress.com/about/> or click on [From Works to Words for God's Promises by Peter Krey](#)

Polanyi has an interesting footnote on page 227-228. He speaks about immanence and that brings immanent language to my mind.⁹ I remember how a Marxist in Berlin once claimed that when he spoke the word "state," the state itself participated in that word, was even contained in the word, was identical with the word. That is like Luther saying that in theology *verbum* = *res* and in philosophy it does not. John Searles would classify the realities produced by language as "ontologically subjective and epistemically objective."¹⁰ I wonder if those long philosophical concepts could be telescoped into Luther's embodied words, incarnate words. Words have meaning but they also have physicality: modulating wave frequencies or perturbations of air. Getting to Max Eastman:

On page 59: Max Eastman's concept of science would be diametrically opposed to that of Polanyi:

The task of the metaphysician, speaking very broadly, is to transplant into these empty abstractions [being, becoming, quantity, number, and so forth] that personal moral spirit, the defender of custom and established right, which is being driven out of the concrete world by the development of the scientific view. His task is to preserve animism at all cost, and to show that the "highest" function of the mind after all, and no matter what science may achieve, is

⁹ This will come up in the notes below.

¹⁰ John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, (New York: The Free Press, 1995), p. 63. See my Study of Performative Declarations, Social Movements, and Creation via Language: <https://peterkrey.wordpress.com/?s=ontologically>

still to reconcile us with the world, rather than to help us change it.¹¹

Polanyi wants the return of the personal moral spirit and finds the ruthless objectivism that Eastman represents a distortion of what the real history of science demonstrates. The spirit is not necessarily reactionary or conservative, it can be progressive too, as in the *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* by Henri Bergson. The one reinforces the status quo and the other ushers in the new paradigm, which historically takes place in the scientific revolutions (Thomas Kuhn) as much as in the conservative support of the status quo, versus the change agents who want to change society.

Eastman, on page 70 brought up criticism against him from Leon Trotsky in endnotes, pages 357 to 358. Max Eastman translated Trotsky's three volumes of *The History of the Revolution* into English, for which Trotsky was grateful, but he had "a feeling which is the direct opposite of thankfulness" because Eastman argued that dialectical materialism was a disguised religion (imported from Hegel), which he wanted to keep out of America, "while bringing the Marxism science in."

¹¹ Eastman, *Marxism: Is It Science?*, page 59. Polanyi, post-critically wants integrity and conviction back in our knowledge and assertions. How can Eastman want to drive personal moral spirit out of our concepts and thoughts? After Hitler perpetrated the Holocaust and Stalin allowed millions of Ukrainians to starve to death because they thwarted his will?! What brought about the legacy of corruption in former Soviet countries? Eastman has a point about changing the world, but how are ethics and praxis to be related? A philosophy might well be unconscious or ignore the base (as in superstructure and base], but how are both enveloped in morality?

(p. 358) Trotsky argued that Eastman was attempting "to translate Marxian dialectics into the language of vulgar empiricism." Eastman counters that his courageous empiricism is "a plain man's belief that knowledge does actually come from experience" and Trotsky's saying that it comes from somewhere else, "thereby concedes a rationalistic or a priori element in dialectical philosophy." (p. 358) Eastman is arguing that the latter is the source of the religious moment, which he argues distorts the scientific dimension of Marxism. According to Eastman, dialectical materialism makes Marxism a religion in disguise.

On page 91 Eastman writes that for Marx, as a philosopher, a class struggle was not a concrete fight between people, but an abstract contradiction between generalities - between "forces of production" and "production-relations." Thus he could argue, "And since all past history was but the dialectical life-story of such contradictions" he could assert that "All past history, with the exception of its primitive stages, was the history of class struggle," which Eastman finds preposterous, (p. 91) arguing, "If Copernican astronomy is subject to explanation as a result of economic motions on earth, it is not a true science of motion in the heavens."

On Darwin and evolution, I had a very different take from Eastman, pages 92-94. Eastman relates that Marx and Engels

celebrated Darwin's evolution, and thought Darwin's discovery "a glorious corroboration and completion of the Marxian theory."

(p. 93) But Eastman argued that where Darwin excluded the religious beliefs from biology, Marxism smuggled them back in via dialectical materialism.

Now in my German book, *How Can Marxism Consider itself a [Natural] Science?* I worked with the footnote in *Das Kapital*, (on page 392-393 in volume I) where Marx compares his theory with Darwin's. I always could not understand the end of this footnote, which has to do with the base producing the intellectual and even spiritual super-structure. Similar statements also come up in Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" and Eastman explains those statements for me later in his book.¹²

¹² I thought Feuerbach's theses as explained by Eastman would help me understand the technological footnote on page 392 in *Das Kapital*, vol. I. Eastman did help me understand Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, but not the same words are used in the footnote as in the theses. To translate once again from the German:

Technology contains the active relation of human nature, the immediate processes of production of their lives, and with that, also their social relations of life, and the spiritual imaginations that well up out of them. All the history of religion itself, which is abstracted from this material basis - is uncritical. It is in fact much easier through analysis to find the earthly kernel of religion's nebulous constructions, than, the other way around; to develop the real relations of life every time out of its heavenly formations. But the latter method is the one that is materialist and scientific. The inadequacy of abstract natural scientific materialism, which excludes the historical process can already be seen from the abstract and ideological presentations of its spokes-persons, as soon as they dare to venture beyond their specializations.

In my German book called: *How can Marxism claim to be a (Natural) Science?* I remember that I dealt over and over again with these passages of Marx. It is true that even Thomas Kuhn in his *The Nature of Scientific Revolutions* shows

But getting back to this footnote, Marx argues that Darwin directed our attention to his interest in the history of natural technology, i.e., how the skeletal systems developed for the productive life of organisms. Should not the history of the development of the production organs [technology] of human beings in society deserve the same attention, as the material basis for every particular social organization? So roughly Marx is arguing that the evolution of exo- or endo-skeletons in biological organisms precedes the evolution of technology in social organisms, because technology reveals the active relation of human beings with nature in the immediate production processes of life. Human beings first used their own strength to labor, then invented tools, then harnessed the strength of animals like oxen and donkeys, then invented machines, like the spinning machine, for which not even the use of a finger was necessary. Marx continues by arguing that inventions were much more collective endeavors than individual breakthroughs and to study technology should be easier, because natural history differs from human history, in that we made the latter, but not the former. That sentence ends his footnote. I would argue

that scientists had their history wrong. As in textbooks, they proceeded from experiment to experiment, but actually scientific breakthroughs came by revelations which experiments often could only verify many years later.

against Marx that we participated in human history and did not create it, which I believe he means by the word "make." Although we could, however, say that we made and developed technology. I wonder about how much control we have over how technology changes us personally and socially, however. Marshall McLuhan argued way back in 1964 that the medium was the message, and we don't consciously pick up on how the new technology changes us, what the gain as opposed to the loss.¹³

Of course, if we follow Marx, he uses the class struggle to show the evolution of social paradigms from the primitive to the feudal to the capitalist to the socialist and to the communist societies. Dialectical materialism breaks down, however. His philosophical model can't be imposed on history and still reflect history accurately. For example in my field in early modern history, the peasants fought against feudalism and the burghers, for the most part, turned against them. But the burghers were supposed to fight against feudalism and bring about capitalism. A Marxist might argue that this history predated the industrial revolution, where workers or the proletariat had not yet developed their alienation because of being exploited by the bourgeoisie (burghers). But Russia and China were pre-industrialized and Marxism was introduced,

¹³ Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding the Media: the Extensions of Man*, (New York: a Mentor Book, 1964).

perhaps we have to say, imposed there. The progression of the paradigms via the class struggle breaks down completely in this history. With "worker owned factories," as signs prominently posted outside on their walls, Russian tanks put down German worker strikes. And what has developed for the proletariat today? Class consciousness of workers has diminished, it seems and not to have strengthened in the face of the owners of capitalism. Politicians are carrying on the struggle, not a workers' movement.

In any case, Eastman argues and celebrates Darwin because he took religion out of biology, where Marx said he took it out of society, but then smuggled it back in with Hegel. Turning Hegel's dialectical idealism on its head by theorizing dialectical materialism, still contained the wishful metaphysics of Hegel, which Eastman argues is anti-scientific.

Let me put in, that which Eastman felt made Darwin and Marx scientific will later be seen to be exactly what Polanyi, Collingwood, and Kuhn criticize about science as a distortion of its real essence and history.

Page 93:

Darwin's achievement was to banish the ethicodeific (sic) out of biology, establish the fact of evolution on a scientific basis, and point out a dominating principle of investigation and matter-of-fact explanation. And Marx made almost exactly the same contribution to the general science of history. He put in the place of moralistic and religious and poetic and patriotic eloquences a matter-of-fact

principle of explanation, which has become the dominating one for all freely inquiring minds, and he established - or at least first adequately emphasized - the fact that there has been an evolution, not only in the political forms of society, but in its economic structure.

Now think of Polanyi's dynamic-objective coupling: if you criticize Marxism from an ethical standpoint, it defends itself on the grounds that it is a science; if you criticize it on scientific grounds, it defends itself on the grounds that it overcomes alienation and exploitation. In this way it gains immunity from criticism.

So Polanyi's dynamic-objective coupling supports Max Eastman contention that Marxism via dialectical materialism is also a religion in disguise. But there is scientism, in which science replaces religion, but cannot help but fail in doing so, and there is the cult of objectivism, bringing about the eclipse of human subjects.

On page 97 Eastman puts his agreement with Polanyi in so many words:

We have here, then, the same confusion of condition and cause which I have mentioned in the most fundamental of those conscious devices by which Marxism perpetuates itself as an animistic philosophy while pretending to make an empirical investigation of history.

But Eastman's outdated concept of science, already pointed to, is now problematic. Now science is being considered more like a humanity. Personal affirmation is inherent in knowledge, in Polanyi's post-critical philosophy. Somehow, metaphysics can

be affirmed once again, where scientific physics in Eastman's time (1940), just seems to have completely replaced "an outdated" metaphysics.¹⁴ But Eastman argues that there is no place for metaphysics in Marxism, "the thing is to replace Marxian metaphysics with a scientific methodology which will not ignore the lessons learned from Darwin" (p. 93) i.e., there is no goal or purpose in evolution and it is wishful thinking by Marxists to anticipate the evolution of a lower society into a higher one.

My following citation of Eastman brought to mind Luther's *verbum = res* of theology, where he says that condition does not hold for philosophy.¹⁵ Eastman writes,

"Intellectual people, however, who live among ideas as though they were things, and may be likened in that respect to insane people, usually forget this fact." (p. 135)

That is, "reality slips out of the grip of logic," (p. 136) even dialectical logic. Hegel holds that the rational is real and the real is rational. Eastman would say, it is definitely not. He

¹⁴ Hence the Linguistic Turn in philosophy. Because science pulled the rug out from under philosophy maintaining that it had replaced metaphysics, philosophers turned their attention to the study of language to help out the objective endeavors of science and with that the Philosophy of Language was developed by J. L. Austin and John Searle, among others.

¹⁵ Oswald Bayer, *Martin Luthers Theologie: eine Vergegenwärtigung*, (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2003), page 48. "*Signum philosophicum est nota absentis rei, signum theologicum est nota presentis rei.*" (Weimar Ausgabe: *Martin Luther Tisch Reden* 4,666, 8f (Nr. 5106; 1540): "The philosophical sign is the note of an absent thing. The theological sign is the note of a present thing." *Verbum = res* theologically and *verbum ≠ res* is my shorthand for this distinction. In Luther's performative sense the word brings the thing into existence. Eastman is not aware of this dynamic dimension of language.

rejects the "liquified Logic called Hegelian." (p. 136) Hegel he argues in "his religious ceremony of 'dialectical thinking'... pretends that it is a reproduction of the flux of reality." (Ibid.) "Nature slips out of fixed concepts." (p. 138) Hegel is an arduous metaphysician and the super-logical and the sub-logical have no place in applied science. (p. 140) Eastman held that modern science has replaced metaphysics and philosophy. They belong to a bygone era. Since the work of Polanyi and Kuhn, we no longer believe that anymore. Science has not brought the salvation of humankind, but horrendous evil along with abundant good.

Eastman designates the Hegelian nonsense:

After about two hours expended in that merely preliminary scientific fashion, the whole myth about negating negations, and seeking in everything for its opposite, and never resting in an affirmative statement, and studying everything in its logical self-movement, its inner hostility against itself, and remembering that things can be both themselves and their opposites, and that cause and effect merge into each other, and that quantity becomes quality, and that nature makes jumps - the whole mixture of scientific commonplace with Hegelian higher-logical buncombe, which has been poured out of the centers of Marxist education in Russia under the guise of instruction in the art of thinking - would go up in the air and be forgotten forever. (p. 140-141)

Eastman is depicting Hegel here and throwing him out. But this is how Eastman observed how Marxists think and come to a conclusion in a scientific experiment. But Marxists certainly

put brackets between their ideology and the scientific method, which they could not afford to distort with dialectics.

Page 144-145: Marx and Lenin summarized the dialectic as the "free movement" of the mind in "empirical matter." Engels too declared that "the kernel of the dialectical view" is the knowledge that nature is fluid, and that "fixity and absoluteness are the products of our minds." Eastman refers those interested in this subject to Sydney Hook's study of Engel's conception of dialectical thinking: "Dialectic and Nature," in the Marxist Quarterly, vol. 12, No. 2, April-June, 1937.

Eastman page 149: Science stems mainly from practical trained and organized common sense, accessible to and verifiable by everybody who has the leisure and the ability to understand its results; it has no kinship with privately delightful subjective beliefs. (This is not word for word but shortened.)

NB: interestingly enough, when Eastman writes about "Intellectual people, however, who live among ideas as though they were things," he ascribes it to philosophy as being a religion. (page 135) Again for philosophy, Luther maintains *verbum* does not = *res*, but for theology, i.e., for religion *verbum* = *res*.¹⁶ In this way he agrees with Luther, because he

¹⁶ See footnote 14.

claims that Hegel's philosophy is a religion in disguise. If we take into consideration that Hegel, as a Lutheran pastor, also in part derived his philosophy from Luther's theology, then Eastman has somewhat more evidence for his position.

When Luther however holds with *verbum = res*, then he is into the performative nature of language and that all the goods that we receive from God have to come from the Word proclaimed. In his own words:

"All our goods are only in words and promises. For heavenly things cannot be shown as present; they can only be proclaimed by the word."¹⁷

And getting back to the performative, God is the speaker, who makes promises and keeps them, issues commands for us to obey them. The promises are the gospel that give us the wherewithal to be able to carry out the commands, to fulfil the law.

In trying to understand Polanyi's footnote No. 3 on page 228, which I thought related to this subject, he is not getting at *verbum = res*, but for example, morality being immanent in the material interests of the proletariat. He is not referring to a symbol, but to a striking event which "assimilates what it means to the extent of affirming the presence of the thing within itself. For example among primitives, if a lion tears a man to

¹⁷ James Samuel Preuss, *From Shadow to Promise*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 247.

pieces, an envious neighbor must have participated in it. When there is a plague, then the intentions of a witch must also have been involved. So Polanyi is getting at the animism that Eastman also finds in Marxism, because of the unscientific dialectical materialism, which smuggles it in. Luther's theological sense can now be explained *via* the Philosophy of Language, where he ascribes performative speech acts to religion. Of course, where Marx in his last Thesis on Feuerbach (No. 11) proclaims, "Philosophers have all variously interpreted the world, the point however is to change it." He also strikes a performative religious note. Listen to Luther: "For the Word of God comes, whenever it comes, to change and renew the world."¹⁸

On page 173, Eastman asserts that we shall see with complete finality that [Marxism] has no right to the name and authority of science. Eastman then proceeds to show how Marx starts with studying Hegel and launches his theory converting German idealism to materialism and that via Feuerbach. Thus Marx launches his theory from philosophy and not science.

Page 183: Feuerbach declared Hegelianism and indeed speculative philosophy in general, to be nothing but theology rationalized and brought home to the mind. Hegel's thesis: being is thought.

¹⁸ **Luther's Works**, vol. 33, p. 52. **Luthers Werke**, Weimar Edition, vol. 18: p. 626, lines 25-27, 31-32.

Page 184: Feuerbach argued that the object was sensible and made out of thought alone. He separates the divine world from the earthly one and denying the former, substitutes anthropology for theology, considering the former his universal science.

Materialists argue that human beings are just a wave in the physical processes of external nature. Feuerbach's religion of love is theology rationalized and made into an anthropology.

Page 187: Feuerbach held that sensibility = the objective reality of the world. Marx agreed but argues that Feuerbach left out of the sensible - the active element of practical human action, which the sensible objective reality contained. But for Marx, reality is a purposive process and the highest state of science is co-operating with, and participating in, the forward and upward on-going of that reality toward high ends. The chief fault, according to Marx, in materialism is that the object, reality, sensibility is conceived under the form of the object or of contemplation, not sensory-human activity, praxis, not subjectively. More simply, according to Eastman, the chief fault of materialism is that the object is not conceived as an active subject!¹⁹

¹⁹ His underscoring of the active subject is interesting, because I have just helped a blind scholar, Oscar Pemantle publish a book, ***Contrasting Arguments: the Culture War and the Clash in Education*** (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 2019), where the Marxist Paulo Freire determines that students in the craft of teaching should not be treated as objects, but active subjects. Pemantle champions the Socratic method of teaching.

Page 188: Object sensations are to be conceived subjectively- and as purposive activities. (praxis) Revolutionary philosophy teaches "practical critical action," which is the substance of being.

NB: reading Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach in Marx und Engels: ***Ausgewählte Schriften***, (*Selected Writings*), (Berlin: Dietz Verlag), page 196: NB: not only is a philosophical system related to a social system; while in bourgeoisie cases, they are usually oblivious to the latter. And not only are there philosophies that do not relate their thoughts to a social system; the truthfulness of thoughts themselves have to be born out by praxis. So a philosophy has to be related to sociology and that is not yet enough, the *praxis* of developing the society further toward socialism is also required for its growing embodied truth.

NB: as an analogy to the above: Hegel's philosophy issues out of the Trinity and ultimately returns to the Trinity and the dialectic thought is also trinitarian: the thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Somewhat similarly: there is Marxism and its base, its thoughts and praxis. Because Hegel rejects a false infinite, i.e., one that does not also contain the finite, the earth, the world, the whole universe for Hegel is also contained in the Holy Trinity.

Page 194: ideas are epiphenomenal to real sense-objects, but there is purposive dialectical movement toward higher ends. According to Eastman, the latter is not a scientific point of view, but mysticism itself.

Page 195: Marx thought that he had saved the "rational kernel" and gotten rid of the "mystical shell" in Hegelian philosophy. While coming to page 220 in Eastman, where he is dealing with Lenin, to reiterate, science has also turned into scientism for many of us today. Scientism means that science has become a faith, a religion dealing with the ultimate - and Eastman is oblivious to this phenomenon in our reality. He is trying to extirpate religion from Marxism in order to "purify" it as a science. He may be like the East German communists, in my experience, who considered religion, even Christianity as nothing other than superstition. Meanwhile today, science has become the religion for many. Reading C. F. von Weizsäcker, to translate the title: ***What Science is Competent to Deliver***,²⁰ he shows that science suffers from ambiguity, meaning that it can be used for good and evil, and thus, science in replacing religion goes beyond its competence.

²⁰ C.F. von Weizsäcker, ***Die Tragweite der Wissenschaft***, vol. I, (Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag, 1964).

Marxism can be considered a myth played out by classes,²¹ but these classes really failed to materialize. Oscar Pemantle in the above mentioned book,²² speaks about inversions in the legacy of Marxism (inversions much like those of an image in a mirror): the withering away of the state became a totalitarian completely overbearing state, the proletariat has not strengthened because worker movements are not predominant anymore and unions themselves have weakened substantially.

Lenin versus Marxism as metaphysics: material elements of the world were not automatically evolving toward socialism. The thoughts of socialists were supposedly a mere reflection of this inexorable process.

NB: What socialists describe here seems like a social mysticism. But on page 226, Eastman goes the next step into *praxis*. There are those who are merely for ideas and those who put ideas into action. Much more becomes involved when a society becomes transformed by an ideology. The transformation taking place in the action-reflection-action model can move in first, second, or third gear, or, of course, reverse, to use a metaphor from driving an automobile.

²¹ The workers as the slaves that Marx calls out of "Egyptian" capitalism into the promised land of socialism.

²²Oscar Pemantle, ***Contrasting Arguments***: see footnote 19.

On pages 245-246 Eastman asserts that Lenin would have gotten rid of all metaphysics. That makes him like the outdated scientists, whom Polanyi criticizes.

Page 245: Eastman writes

Lenin, educated as a dialectical materialist, remained unaware of the existence of a natural science, which would have supported his assertion of the dynamic function of ideas.

The conception of conscious thought as an instrument of adaptation produced by material nature in the evolution of living organisms, just as other organic functions are produced, is a product and continuation of that hard-headed confrontation of scientific facts which Lenin tried to defend in his philosophy.

NB: Oscar Pemantle said that John Searle felt that consciousness was a biological function much like that of digestion. Pemantle thought that consciousness was independent and experienced by a subject, who was thinking and thus it was different from a biological function.

On page 246, There it is! Eastman says the same thing as Searle: "recognizing the origin and biological function of human intelligence."

Page 246 and 247: science is not a philosophy. It is really a method of affirmative skepticism. NB: Eastman never really describes the scientific method, with its controlled variables, the constants, the control, and margin of error, etc.

Page 248-249: If Lenin could have held that Marxism was not the philosophy of dialectical materialism, it would have helped.

Because it has to be

a philosophy of affirmative skepticism - an intellectual attitude which denies the validity of philosophy, while affirming the validity of science which understands it. It is exactly the attitude which is forced upon a man who knows the biological origin and function of his own intelligence, the attitude of a scientist who includes genetic psychology in his equipment. That is why I think this attitude would have been more grateful to Lenin's mind than the animistic metaphysics which he felt compelled to assert, and which he asserted with excessive and unnatural dogmatism.

NB: Lenin was dogmatic about dialectical materialism because he probably realized that it was untrue.

Page 252: Marx devoted himself to economics and left to Engels to formulate their common philosophy. "Engels had neither the inventive genius nor the depth of intellectual conscience that Marx had."

Page 253: consciousness in general reflects existence, social consciousness reflects social existence - even like a photograph. NB: Eastman cannot make a distinction between consciousness using language to reflect reality and performative language that changes realities.

Page 255: the human is nothing but a "complex of social relations" according to Marx. NB: That is a reductionism of a human being, because it leaves out individuation. I believe that a mature person and a sound community belong together. They can

have an inner unity, because true unity differentiates and does not confound and it is a false habit of mind to play off the individual against the group. (Teilhard de Chardin).

In Plato the individual psychology is merely a microcosm of the politics of the state. Nicholas Berdyaev argues that Plato really didn't grasp the particular and therefore the individual. That is probably why Plato equated the psychology of a person with the politics or macrocosm of the state. In a somewhat similar way, Marx has a collectivist point of view, where he sees human beings as merely a complex of social relations. Back on page 191 dealing with Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, Eastman also takes objection to Marx's characterization that the essence of human beings "in its reality is the ensemble of social relations": This statement by Marx, according to Eastman, is pure metaphysics and Marxists should not try to cover up this fact by claiming Marx was founding social psychology, because he eliminates psychology with this thesis. (p. 191)

On page 256: Lenin: "Professors of philosophy are the learned errand-boys of the theologians!" NB: Lenin is rejecting metaphysics.

Page 259: Eastman argues that science leaves people in a cold and barren world to which they want an illegitimate escape into a humanly warming metaphysics. The rescue has to come in the pure experience of things, which can be provided by poetry. NB:

I think of Matthew Arnold and Max Weber who suffered from the loss of enchantment that science brought into the world.

Einstein would leave us in mathematical equations.²³ Eastman rejects a return to religion, metaphysics or jumping back into an animistic attitude to reality. "But there is another way out of this barren world offered to us by science," he writes, "and that is to declare the parallel and equal rights of poetry, or the pure experience of things." (259) NB: What could he mean by the latter? There is the ordinary, everyday level of interpretation and of course, but the scientific level, as in atoms, subatomic particles, etc. is not accessible to pure experience.

Pages 260-262: Eastman has a critique of what Marxism does to morality and I do not think he goes far enough. What does explain all the corruption in communist countries? Max Weber said that you can have bureaucracy or corruption. Communist countries have had both. According to Eastman, "A practical social science would also abandon the irresponsible Marxian generalizations about morals." Another problem with Marxism, according to Eastman: "to reduce the whole wisdom of personal life, along with all the other achievements of the human brain,

²³ Actually Einstein believed in the God of Spinoza and restated Kant's formula in his way: "Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind." (Science, Philosophy and Religion: a Symposium (1941)

to a mere reflection of social relations that are determined by the state of productive forces," blurs moral intelligence. (261)

Evil and good are not merely two aspects of "a single dialectical process - evil being the progressive disturbing side - the natural dress and appellation of the revolution." (261)

NB: Consider Luther and how God's promises are always kept under the form of their opposites. Good and evil are opposites of each other, but Luther is enduring and waiting upon God with trust and he is not referring to dialectics in a single process.

NB: Mikhail Bakunin in ***God and the State*** written in 1871,²⁴ shows how he really sided with Satan over God and used Voltaire's statement, changing the words, "If God really existed, it would be necessary to abolish him." As a rebel and anarchist he interprets evil as good and good as evil. Eric Voegelin writes about his pact with the devil in ***From Enlightenment to Revolution***, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1972).

Eastman writes, "In my opinion religions frequently cherish moral irresponsibility more than they correct it. And this religion of Marxism is no exception to the rule." (261)

NB: Along with reason, religion is a source of morality and when a religion such as Christianity is designated as nothing

²⁴ The book is available in the Internet: Mikhail Bakunin, ***God and the State*** , written in 1871 and published posthumously. The real title was later discovered: ***The Historical Sophisms of the Doctrinaire School of Communism***, <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/godstate/ch01.htm>

else but a superstition by Marxism, a collectivist half-truth also like a secular religion, then morality can go by the wayside. The Stalin purges and the NAZI concentration camps, and the killing fields of Cambodia, were all anti-Christian - not that some complicity cannot be argued, in terms of Christian anti-Semitism, in the NAZI case. But this is too large a topic for the purpose of these notes.

Eastman concludes his section on morals: "In short, while abandoning the illusion that the success of the revolution was metaphysically inevitable, Lenin declared that without honesty in the vanguard it was actually impossible." (262)

Page 267: Dialectical materialism is nothing but the old shoes of the Almighty God.

Page 270: "Another example of Marxian utopianism is the theory of the automatic 'dying away' of the state - a theory that has been reduced to such dreadful absurdity by the state capitalist tyranny of Stalin that we need not discuss it."

Page 271: Eastman states that Bertrand Russell has a far more realistic vision about how life in factories could be transformed by representatives running them, instead of capitalist owners. He takes a paragraph out of Russell's book,

In Praise of Idleness.²⁵

²⁵ Bertrand Russell, ***In Praise of Idleness***, (Bombay, India: George Allen & Unwin, 1973). First printed in London, George Allen & Unwin, 1935.

Page 302: NB: If philosophy to Hegel meant capturing the world in thought, then by Marx turning Hegel's idealism on its head, he could have inverted the world captured in Hegel's philosophy. But the inverted image in a mirror is backwards and not upside down. Oscar Pemantle's theory of inversion should be investigated to determine if it is correct.

Page 303: to cast off the idealist philosophy of Hegel:

"Feuerbach managed this, in the main, by reversing Hegel's opinion about the comparative 'reality.' In order to reach the veritable reality, according to Hegel, it is necessary to depart from sense-experience...in the direction of ideas. Feuerbach simply asserted that, on the contrary, sense-experience is the real thing, and ideas are secondary." Then he argues that *to sense is to be*. Thus *passion, and then, not to love is not to be*. Feuerbach is still trying to have religion with his philosophy, and one grounded in sensibility rather than merely abstract thoughts and ideas. Marx then wanted to make the real object, not sensible, but have subjective human activity be the real object.

My own book, which I wrote in German, ***How Can Marxism Claim to be (a Natural) Science?***²⁶ Is very different from that of Max

²⁶ Pfarrer Peter Krey, *Die Frage nach der Naturwissenschaftlichkeit des Marxismus: Michael Polanyi, Max Weber, und Karl Marx*. (Berlin-Dahlem, 1975-1976). In a revision of April 1981, I added: Some Theodor Adorno, Helmut Gollwitzer, C.F. von Weizsäcker, and Jean-Paul Sartre. A Scholardarity

Eastman. He was much more deeply involved in Marxism and translated three volumes of Trotsky, as well as being the author of *Stalin's Russia*. His critique comes from an internal place and becoming critical of its scientific claim while being a religion in disguise. Eastman is very anti-religious and still champions an outdated concept of science, about which Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn are very critical. My position is like that of Einstein's above, where I value and cherish my religion as well as the updated concept of science, which makes it much more like a humanity, when it becomes realistic about the real history of science, which Thomas Kuhn states resembles nothing more than theology.²⁷

Scientists have distorted their own history, which has not proceeded objectively from experiment to experiment, but via the consensus of the scientific community. Part of the community held and supported a paradigm, while those with challenges to it were rejected, until a paradigm shift took place. The shift did not occur until all the insights of the old paradigm were preserved in the new paradigm which understood new discoveries about nature far better and more accurately. This history described by Thomas Kuhn did not preclude the scientific method

Publication: http://www.scholardarity.com/?page_id=4887 A new English preface introduces the German book.

²⁷ Thomas Kuhn, *The Nature of Scientific Revolutions*, (The University of Chicago Press, 1962), see pages 135, 157, and 165.

and experiments, but also included revelations of scientists that could only be proven by experiments decades later. Eastman still adhered to a concept of science that in a cult of objectivity, according to Polanyi, distorted its history and rejected its reality as a human enterprise with a scientific community and had careers, egos, life investments, and research grants involved.

But as C. F. von Wiezsäcker argued, science cannot replace religion, because it is ambiguous, meaning that its insights and its technological offspring can be used for good and evil. It cannot bear the burden of things ultimate, the way religion has done from time immemorial. But religion too, needs to be open to questioning. In Henri Bergson's terms, it can be a static one, like the scientist who hold and support the old paradigm, or the dynamic religion, that is open and discovering the new paradigm: like Jesus, (from a human point of view) who challenged the exclusive, legalism of the day, with the Gospel of a loving Father God, who covered people with favor and grace, they did not deserve, and had a heart filled with forgiveness. In Japan, one could speak of Shinran, who championed faith rather than adhere to mountains of ritual and founded Pureland Buddhism. Or in early modern times, a Martin Luther proclaimed the new Christian paradigm, that people receive their integrity by grace through faith and that not by works. The Word of God comes,

whenever it comes, to change and renew the world! He wrote in the **Bondage of the Will**.²⁸

Because my thoughts have never been captured by Marx and Engels and I never converted to Marxism, like Georg Lukács, for example, I explored this powerful ideology from an external point of view. From the critique of Michael Polanyi, that of Max Weber, Helmut Gollwitzer, Jean-Paul Sartre, to name a few. It took me to a place where some of Marx's dynamic social analysis is very important, but understanding the need for a new social paradigm, is a paramount concern for our times.

²⁸ See footnote 18 above.