x Bookmark Appendix Jason Zarri Some may have noticed that on my account, as it stands, bivalence will fail for empty nouns or noun-phrases. A false-maker for a sentence is defined as a reference-maker for its subject term which is not a reference-maker for its predicate term. If the subject term is empty, it more »
x Bookmark Part 3: Philosophical Implications Jason Zarri I think my approach has the advantage that it can explain why necessary truths don’t have everything as a truth-maker. Granted, “The Earth has exactly one moon –> the Earth has exactly one moon” is true no matter what, but it does not therefore have everything as more »
x Bookmark Part 2: A Quasi-Formal Account Jason Zarri I will now define truth-makers for truth-functional compounds and quantified sentences. To define truth-makers for them, we will also require the notion of a false-maker: We say that x false-maker for a subject-predicate sentence p iff x is a reference-maker for p’s subject term but is not a more »
x Bookmark Part 1: Introducing the Idea Jason Zarri In this post I introduce the idea of reference-making, which I take to be more-or-less undefined, and use it to account for the idea of truth-making for subject-predicate sentences. I take a truth-maker to be a reference-maker for a sentence. In Part 2 I’ll give a quasi-formal more »
x Bookmark A Problem for Hume’s Problem of Induction Jason Zarri Could Hume consistently believe that his argument to the effect that inductive inferences are not justified is successful? In this post I put forward reasons to think the answer is “no.” Hume, very basically, argued that inductive inferences are not justified more »
x Bookmark Stephen Lee Naish has a new article in Philosophy; Myspace: The Place Where Culture Goes to Die.
x Bookmark Scott Ryan has a new essay in Philosophy, A Short Argument for Eternalism.
x Bookmark Towards A Kinder, Gentler Verificationism A Sketch of a Research Project Jason Zarri It often happens, for various reasons, that philosophers defend radical views which, first, are too radical to be plausible, and second, are such that a less radical and more plausible view would satisfy the underlying more »